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Human  activity  directed  to  knowledge,  like  Man’s  day-to-day  action  in  general,  is  obliged  to 
proceed by trial and error and to develop by the free interplay and confrontation of ideas, for the 
simple reason that human cognitive capacities are limited. The point is to prevent this trial-and-error 
method  from  proceeding  blindly.  This  requires  methodological  rules  that  permit  judging  the 
explanatory power of ideas and theoretical proposals; which means recognizing clearly enough the 
contribution  of models  and theories  to the advancement  of earlier  knowledge and hence to  the 
intelligence  of  decision-making,  by  comparison  with  earlier  theories.  This  methodological 
procedural  support  is  indispensable  to  the  advance  of  knowledge,  i.e.  to  the  accumulation  and 
growth  of  knowledge  based  on  knowledge.  Creativeness,  by  definition,  is  not  the  product  of 
method.  But  method  is  indispensable  for  selecting  the  contributions  of  creative  processes  to 
knowledge. In a world where all modes of thought and judgment are accorded equal dignity,  as 
advocated  by  methodological  anarchy  (improperly  called  ‘pluralism’),  knowledge  will  grow 
haltingly and advance in a most confused fashion. A number of scholars, most notably Feyerabend, 
have disputed the comparability of theories with sophisticated, even stimulating arguments. Their 
critical  contribution  deserves  appreciation,  but  their  negation  of  method  denies  science  and  is 
accordingly unacceptable.
The title of the book, Economic Theory and Social Change, contains an implicit question: is there 
an economic structure separate from social structures and their evolution? The principle question is 
whether economics is actually analyzing a substructure of the surrounding social structure. If so 
there are few possibilities for isolating a logical system of the economic structure within the realm 
of the social structure when we live in a dynamic society. Our scope with this book which appears 
in the second part of the title,  Problems and Revision, implies that we want to discuss the logical 
problems of such an isolation, and we will also suggest some revisions of the theory in order to  
bring in other questions and other analytical approaches.   
Not seldom, it is said that the market is always right. For those not understanding the language of 
economics  the  relevant  question  is  of  course  ‘who  is  the  market?’  but  for  economists  this 
proposition is also a bit tricky, after the financial debacle autumn 2008. We may ask the leading 
persons of the financial industry why they did not listen to the advices of the market. Did some 
agents wish to have a breakdown and some not or is the market result something else than the sum 
of good wishes and optimal individual behavior? If either of these explanations are true we are at 
difference with the traditional neoclassical market theory.
Furthermore  it  is  sometimes  claimed  that  the  market  should  govern  itself  and further  that  the 
market,  although void of any ethics,  leads towards results which are ethically acceptable in the 
society. A prominent banker in Sweden claimed in an editorial debate article in one of the biggest 
Swedish newspaper, spring 2008, that moral questions were to be hold outside the realm of the 
markets  and that  markets  will  correct themselves with respect  to moral  failures.  That  is  a very 
convenient approach – the individual agent has no responsibility for the aggregate result but that is 
fixed by someone beside or above the human agents, maybe we can call this agent the  invisible  
hand.
These  lines  of  argument  are  probably  due to  Adam Smith’s  famous  Invisible  Hand.  Scientists 
within economics seldom discuss this Invisible Hand seriously except for historical reasons, and 
reject  it  in  its  naïve  form,  however  many main-stream economists  struggle  implicitly  with  the 
question of aggregating microeconomic analysis  into normative discussions of economic policy. 
Keynes frankly dismissed any such possibility by rejecting Say’s law, but in the modern variants of 
neo-classical theory Say’s law lingers in the shadows under the name of Axiom of Local Non-
Satiation and thus there is still a strong temptation to use the neo-classical theory for normative 
analysis of the society in the form of welfare theory.
After the financial debacle in the end of 2008 the general sentiment has also been changed towards 
political actions to support different groups of market agents and the whole banking sector has been 
begging, save for a few financial organizations, for guaranties and help with capital support from 
the taxpayers.
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Another interesting effect of the financial debacle is the remorse it seems to have created among 
economists. The Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman wrote in New York Times, 2nd of September, 2009:
Few economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive failure was the least 
of the field’s problems. More important was the profession’s blindness to the very 
possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy ... the economics profession 
went  astray  because  economists,  as  a  group,  mistook  beauty,  clad  in  impressive-
looking mathematics, for truth ... economists fell back in love with the old, idealized 
vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this 
time gussied up with fancy equations ... Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized 
vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. 
They turned a  blind eye  to  the limitations  of  human rationality  that  often lead to 
bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections 
of markets – especially financial markets – that can cause the economy’s operating 
system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when 
regulators don’t believe in regulation. ... When it comes to the all-too-human problem 
of  recessions  and  depressions,  economists  need  to  abandon  the  neat  but  wrong 
solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets work perfectly." (New York 
Times, September 2nd, 2009.)
First of all, quite a few economists saw the crises coming since the so called NINJA – No Job No 
Income Assets – was discussed several years before the crises and a rather general judgment was 
that the banks and policy makers were out of mind allowing these kind of ‘financial inventions’.  
That people do not listen to what afterwards were regarded as warnings, is not a sign of lacking 
rationality but of different agendas, therefore our question above – did perhaps some agents look at 
a crash as something quite beneficial to them, or was it simply a game of chicken? 
Second, the above quote put all the responsibility on the poor humans who are now declared to be 
totally irrational. It is a huge fall from being perfectly rational to being totally irrational. If we think 
of an economic theory of totally irrational agents we indeed need a chaos theory.
Third, if some agents are more rational and more informed and more economic powerful than others 
and use this to their benefits we run towards a fundamental moral and political analysis and then we 
have to admit that economic structures are part of surrounding social and political structures and 
then the economic theory must realize this fact and include such variables and parameters.  
Yes – the market is always right, in a very precise meaning. If you want to sell something to other 
people to a certain price and you accept the principle of individual freedom to sell and buy then you 
cannot in an intellectually consistent way claim that other people are wrong when they do not want 
to buy the thing to your offered price. You cannot claim that they are irrational. In this precise way 
the market is always right. Whether this can be evolved into an ethical principle other than that 
force shall not be used in market relations, or not, we will not discuss in depth, but we certainly 
discuss the need of ethics.
It seems that economics has developed into a sub-structure within the social structure with its own 
standards of logics, measurements and agents. Social students of other subjects accuse economics of 
being both ‘asocial’ and even ‘anti-social’, but because of the character of economic theory with 
seemingly precise concepts, a seemingly logically consistent market theory, the neoclassical theory, 
and a highly technical methodology, students from other social disciplines have difficulties to find 
the right angle of criticism; it is said that “the proof of the pudding is the eating” and they say it 
tastes  rotten.  Often  their  criticism  is  aimed  at  the  use  of  mathematics  and  critics  within  the 
economic discipline often agree with this line of criticism. 
We find much of this criticism relevant since we reject the notion that the economic structure is the 
core of the social structure, we lean more towards the attitude that the working of the economic 
system is a consequence of, and also reflects, the surrounding social and ethical structures.
With  respect  to  the  question  of  mathematics  we  partly  agree  that  trotting  around  with  poorly 
understood mathematical models often contradictory to the proposed underlying axiomatic structure 
5
is not particularly impressive and we partly agree with Krugman. On the other hand logical analysis 
is  indispensable  in  scientific  work  and all  scientific  work  must  take  seriously  the  question  of 
measurement; mathematics in one or another form is often an excellent tool. But on yet another 
hand, as Russell & Whitehead showed in  Principia Mathematica, mathematics is one of several 
logical  languages.  Mathematics is an extremely valuable logical tool since it  is precise but that 
requires good understanding of the limits of the mathematical analysis. 
It is often claimed that economics, particularly the neoclassical theory, advances Newtonian physics 
into economics and through that also into the social sciences in general. That has fostered counter 
reactions built  on the opinion that we cannot use physical  models  for describing the actions of 
humans.  In  conjunction  with  the  above  mentioned  criticism  of  mathematics  there  have  even 
occurred opinions in favor of anti-rational and anti-logical scientific research.
We agree that particularly the neoclassical economic theory is a variant of a Newtonian equilibrium 
system. But our approach is that this has nothing to do with the use of logics or mathematics but 
with  the  axiomatic  specification  of  the  problem.  It  is  a  matter  of  astonishment  that  long after 
physics has rejected the idea of an everlasting general equilibrium, economics, a basically social 
science,  devotes  analytical  skill  on methods  based on an à  priori  axiomatic  structure  long ago 
rejected by natural sciences.
Whether this is due to inappropriate traditionalism or to ideological ties it is hard to say. However 
we will show that such axiomatic structures transform human beings to n-dimensional rigid bodies. 
Our attitude has nothing principally to do with the use of logical and/or mathematical models per se 
but deals with the axiomatic structure where we show that the basic axiomatic structure of the neo-
classical  theory deprives the humans of being  subjects and as subjects  they are,  in a local and 
temporal setting, final causes.
The acknowledgement of Man as a subject will have vital consequences for both economic theory 
and  methodology.  The  neo-classical  theory  has  provided  us  with  an  efficient  measure  of 
commodities, and development. By rejecting the neo-classical theory we, so to say, throw economic 
theory into a theoretical  chaos.  But  more than that:  by using two of the majestic  paradoxes  in 
mathematical logics, developed during the 20th century, Russell’s Paradox, and by then implicitly 
also Gödel’s paradox, we show that there does not exist a globally rationality. In fact the idea of a 
global rationality has to be replaced by a more humble but also more intriguing proposition.
Another fundamental concept upon which we lean hard is the concept of innovation, as developed 
from a Shumpeterian approach. Our rejections of the neo-classical theory, in fact, opens up a more 
systematic  analysis  of  the  growth process,  but  as  we also  show appropriate  measures  must  be 
developed.
Neoclassical mainstream economics has been the object of a quantity of criticisms even if largely 
different in content than those in the present book. A number of schools of thought has proliferated, 
aimed at remedying the main ‘irrealisms’ and shortcomings of mainstream economics. The most 
relevant  alternative  approaches  are  represented  by  Schumpeterian  and  neoAustrian  teaching. 
Evolutionary and institutional economics and a nebula of theoretical developments denominated 
heterodox economics, have provided a fragmented alternative thought, each component of which, 
while  emphasizing  some relevant  aspect  of  the economic  reality,  forgets  some others,  not  less 
relevant,  aspects.  The  main  cause  of  the  resulting  confusion  is  methodological  poverty  and 
equivocation. A method founded on the most relevant contents and behaviors of the economy, able 
to unify and fertilize the plurality of contributions, is absent; this grants, even today, some attraction 
to  neoclassical  economics  as  provided  by  a  more  stringent  methodological  architecture.  This 
situation suggests an accurate deepening of the main alternative and heterodox  tools, with the aim 
to delineate a more rigorous and comprehensive theory mainly with the support of a methodological 
approach able to capture the main features of the modern dynamic economy.
A  fundamental  effect  of  the  rejection  of  the  neo-classical  theory  is  however  the  necessity  of 
introducing the question of ethics. We show that the stability of the social system in general and the 
economic system in particular requires a generally accepted ethics. Our discussions of ethics have 
6
nothing to do with metaphysical spheres, but are a requirement for the stability of the society. We 
show  a  method  to  derive  objective  values,  in  addition  to  subjective-relative  values  that 
contemporary social thought emphasizes and show the crucial importance of an  objective ethics, 
which  is  strongly  opposed  by  relativism.  The  neoclassical  model  of  thinking  has  sometimes 
produced the idea that the economic system controls and remedies moral deficiencies among the 
agents  via  the  price  system.  This  attitude  is  consistent  with  the  axiomatic  structure,  which 
transforms the agent into an automaton.We emphasize the innovatory process which will have a 
definitive effect on our discussions of ethics. In general ethical discussions focus on preserving the 
conditions  of  existence  for  the  individual,  an  ethics  for  being; however  when  we  introduce 
innovation as a fundamental concept, the ethical discussions must also allow for an ethics granting 
the innovatory ability of the individual, an ethics of doing. 
What has happened during recent years in the world economy culminating in the breakdown of the 
credit system has shown the inability of the market economy is inherent in its structure. From a 
scientific point of view it is a mystery how economic science, after the violent 20th century, still can 
advocate that the pure market economy is stable and that public policies are generally destabilizing. 
It is clear from the neoclassical theory that such conclusions are viable to draw but to us it seems 
equally valid as the Marxist claim of the benefits of the communist economy. Some economists 
even say that the break-down of the Soviet Union is a proof that the Marxist claim is invalid. How 
shall we then comprehend the unwillingness to understand the instability of the market economy? 
We may answer that we have not seen the pure market economy, but then we can equally well 
answer that we have not seen the pure communist economy. 
The fundamental purpose of this book is to show that the market economy is a part of a social and 
cultural structure and thus share all the strengths and weaknesses of such a structure. In economics 
this is actually the basic measure of J.M. Keynes; there are also many others but Keynes may be 
regarded as the intellectual antipode to the neoclassical theory. Attempts have been made to unify 
the two theoretical approaches but that only shows ignorance of the basic lessons in Keynes’ work, 
not only General Theory but Treatise on Probability and particularly The Economic Consequences  
of the Peace and also other works.  
Someone has said once that in order to be a good economist you should at least know three good 
stories about Keynes, so here is one:
It is said that during the 30s the treasury was to decide whether or not to support a certain currency. 
Almost all members of the board were in favour of not supporting it. But at the decisive meeting 
Keynes participated and he needed 15 minutes to persuade the rest of the participants to vote for 
support. When all were prepared to make the formal decision, Keynes raised his hand and said: “On 
the other hand I could be wrong.” What did he mean by saying that? If you advocate an opinion you 
should really know if you are right or wrong. How much better is it to have  -or not have- a well  
established model of let us say 75 000 equations covering all the most important causal relations? 
Well, this is actually the very gist of our analysis and the reason why we rather carefully link our 
discussion to basic philosophy and the philosophy of science. 
The  structure of the book
   We can see the book as four parts with two chapters in each part, of which one chapter analyses  
the general problem and suggests ways out of it and the second chapter deals, on the one hand, with 
the logical problems with respect to the current main-stream methodologies and, on the other, the 
logical difficulties with proposed revisions.
Thus the first part (Chapters 1 and 2) deals with methodological questions: Chapter 1 contains, at 
first, a critical review of a number of important and meaningful schools of thought, starting from 
positivism and hence insisting on the fragmented galaxy that, from the beginning of last century,  
has tried to remedy the shortcomings of  positivist and mainstream economics. Than the chapter 
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deals with general problems of methodology in social sciences and the problem of modelling Man 
in a social context.
There is a growing difficulty of managing the problems in the societies of our age, mainly due to 
the  growing  intensity  of  technical  progress.  This  necessitates  a  fairly  general  analysis,  the 
development of social theorizing into the current state of art. The fact that social thought concerns 
both  what  is  and  what  should  be  implies  that  organizational  rationality  requires  what  must  be 
termed a constructivist standard of rationality, i.e. one that includes the interpretative and normative 
aspects. Important is also the character of its initial hypotheses. They must not consist in nominalist 
postulates, as logical-formal method does, but must consist in realistic premises. A main aspect of 
the proposed method is the distinction between necessity and choice possibility in the organization 
of human societies .
The second chapter deals with the problem of a priori modelling in general and the  neoclassical 
theory in particular, which is the core of economic theory in the sense that it is seen as the theory 
for the free market economy. Furthermore it is often claimed that the political side of the society. 
although perhaps necessary,  nevertheless  creates  inefficiencies  in  the working of  the economy. 
Theoretically this is expressed in the very wording of first best and second best in relation to social 
optimization.  Thus we have to scrutinize the axiomatic structure of the neoclassical theory with 
reference  to its  precise content  of restrictions  with respect to the everyday perceived reality of 
human beings. Thus we will also focus on Arrow’s paradox which results in the claim that this is 
not a logical paradox since it concerns two different definitions of the economic agent. To set for a 
different kind of theorizing the economic reality we suggest a different definition of rationality 
consisting partly of the traditional neoclassical rationality but only in a specific epistemic cycle. The 
latter concept is taken from the physicist and mathematician Thomas Brody. With the help of this  
concept we show that there cannot exist a global rational model, thus there does not exist a global  
optimum for any aggregate economy implying that each agent in it will reach also an individual  
optimum. The fundamental reason for this is that we must treat the individual agent as a subject.
The second part  (Chapters  3 and 4) consists  of an analysis  of ethical  standards for the market 
economy.
In Chapter 3 we analyse the problem of social dynamics with respect to the necessity of an ethics of 
being, that is the necessity of protecting the individual agent, and an ethics of doing, which is the 
necessity to grant the creativity, inventiveness and lust for entrepreneurship of the agents. Thus we 
have to distinguish between necessity and choice/possibility in social organisations. This also means 
that uncertainty must be seen from the aspect of protection but also from the aspect of possibilities.
The fourth chapter is a logical discussion of the connection between ethics and the social space-time 
since we must have both an ethics for being and an ethics for doing and this is a consequence of  
treating economic agents as subjects. We start with an analysis of the ethical consequences of a 
Newtonian time concept and also of a time concept á la Einstein/Minkowsky. This leads us to a 
definition of a social space-time concept which underpins a general formulation of an ethics for the 
democratic society.  Applying our reasoning from Chapter 2, we however show that there cannot 
exist a general aggregate optimum at the same time as all agents reach an individual optimum.
The third  part  is  a  discussion  of  economic  growth and development.  Differently from the two 
previous parts, the analysis here concerns purely economic analysis, and seeds the previous part as a 
method of social thought. Chapter 5 is devoted to the analysis of the structural, institutional and, 
more  in  general,  organizational  necessities of  modern  dynamic  economies,  i.e.  the  main 
organizational  features strictly required by the functioning and the same existence of a modern 
economy. The attention is centred on the role of innovation, radical uncertainty attached both to 
innovation and to other factors exogenous to the economic process; entrepreneurship is analysed 
which is, at the same time, the main actor of innovative process and the bearer of the uncertainty 
attached to them or due to other causes. We shall see that a crucial engine of the whole dynamic 
motion of the economy is the search for profit through innovation, the diffusion of this and the 
adaptive action promoted by disequilibria or, more precisely, the connected opportunities in a world 
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deeply  permeated  by  uncertainty.  We do not  consider  here  income  distribution  and  hence  the 
appropriation of profits. A significant representation of economic dynamics is provided through the 
notion  of  dynamic  competition that  expresses  the  interaction  of  innovation,  uncertainty  and 
entrepreneurship.  In a critical  review we point  out the shortcomings of the different  schools of 
economic  thought  in  representing  the  above  interaction  between  innovation,  uncertainty  and 
entrepreneurship and hence the dynamic process of the economy. 
A formalised general model referable to dynamic economies is then set out and used for simulations
Chapter 6 deals with growth and what happens when we abandon the neoclassical growth models, 
based on Maurice Allais’ equimarginal principle we bring in the demand side and its structure as a 
key aspect of economic growth.
In the first chapter of the last part, Chapter 7, we discuss some fundamental economic problems,  
such as permanent unemployment and the distribution of income and wealth, which we also links to 
the working of the financial side of the economy. 
The last chapter deals with a tentative suggestion of a non-capitalistic market economy. Here the 
choice-possibility  aspect is at the centre stage, an aspect expressed by civilization and other less 
important choices consistent with a dynamic economy. Some considerations are devoted both to the 
spontaneous and voluntaristic  forces that have favoured the birth of capitalism; this is considered a 
peculiar  historic  feature of the modern  dynamic  economy and society.  Then we investigate  the 
possibility of alternative kinds of income distribution and, more in general, of non-capitalistic forms 
consistent  with  a  dynamic  economy,  that  is,  consistent  with  the  structural  and  organizational 
necessities considered in the previous part.
A saying displayed in St. Mary Redcliffe church of Bristol and entitled “Sheep, ships and slavery”, 
which were the main sources of the town wealth, warns: «Church communities,  like all  human 
institutions can be imperfect. It is well for each age to examine its activities and values». This book 
is aimed at improving the possibility to found such examination on a scientific basis. 
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